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Silent Beneficiaries: Affirmative
Action and Gender in Law School
Academic Support Programs
BY DARLENE C. GORING*

INTRODUCTION

T

his Article was developed from a qualitative investigation' of
racial and gender issues that arise in law school academic

support programs. The qualitative investigation initially focused on the
pervasiveness of racial and gender discrimination against students and
faculty members involved with academic support programs.2 Sixteen

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1983, Howard

University; J.D. 1986, LL.M. 1994, Northwestern University. I would like to
thank Carolyn Bratt and Alvin Goldman for their valuable editorial suggestions,
and Sadiqa Moore and Anitria Franklin for their research assistance and
comments.
1 The group interviews were jointly conducted by the author and Dr. Beth
Goldstein, Profess or of Educational Policy, Studies & Evaluation, University of
Kentucky College of Education. Dr. Goldstein separately interviewed two

students who did not participate in any academic support programs.
2

See generally Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race from Legal Education,

28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 51, 83 (Fall 1994) (discussing the presumption
underlying academic support programs that assume that skills enhancement will
put Black students on equal footing with their white counterparts, while denying
the "fundamental differences between African American and white students'
identities or to possible pro-white biases in legal education, the substance of
those programs reasserts the superficiality of any differences. Because skills
deficiencies can be remedied, such deficiencies do not challenge the perceived
sameness of African-American and white law students." Id. at 83�84.}; Kristine
S. Knaplun & Richard H. Sander, The Art and Science of Academic Support, 45

1. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1995) (discussing quantitative investigation and evaluation
of performance of students in academic support programs at the University of
California at Los Angeles); Paul T. Wangerin, Perspectives on Higher Education:
Law Schoo l Academic Support Programs,

40

HASTINGS

L.J.

711 (1989)

(evaluating academic support programs in law school); AN INTRODUCTION TO
ACADEMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION SERVICES (1992)
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female law students3 participated in this investigation by agreeing to

group and individual interv iews concerning t he i r overall law school
experiences and their experience with academic support programs.4

(describing components necessary to implement a fonnal academic support
program in law school).

school
For a comprehensive analysis of affirmative action in t he law
ia
admissions process and an evaluation of academic support programs, see Port
3,
44
L.J.
How.
Y.T. Hamlar, Minority Tokenism in American Law Schools, 26

450 (1983).
3

Profile of female law student participants:
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to solicit the vie�s an
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.
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of women part1c1pants m
the academic support program at the subje ct law
t
en of
�owever, the views of male law
students are an importa nt compon
dialog ue regarding the appropriat
eness of academic support and other cypes 0e
·
explor
. . afive action
affmn
pr�grams in law schools. Upcoming investigations �1·11
of 01ale
this •ssu�, and questions
regarding race and gender, from the persp ective
academic suppart parti
cipants.
sup p�rt
4 In 1994• the subje
ct law school establis he d a fonnal acade mic
as e n
The goal of t he program is to assist first year law students in m � n
gta1111 s no
eammg strategies needed to comp
1ete a successful first year. The pro
ods for
a doctrinal tuton
al for
t year classes. It focuses on study skills, meth
�
organizing course
matenals, outlining, and exa tak ng.
i
m
·

�

rr0�·

.
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former m embers of law school

academic support programs. Two participants were interviewed because
they were invited, but chose to withdraw from the academic support
pro gram.
All interviews5 were preserved on audiotape and transcribed. Because
we agreed to maintain the anonymity of the participants, the students
seemed eager to openly express their views. However, after conducting
the first interview session, several subtle themes underlying the students'
comments began to emerge which indicated limits to their eagerness. A
number of the students were reluctant to acknowledge that they derived
any benefits from affirmative action6 programs. Other students became

The Program consists of several components. Most of the students
interviewed in this study participated in a year long academic support program.
This program provides academic and tutorial assistance to its participants on a
weekly basis throughout the academic year. The participants are taught by
students and faculty members, and are given the opportunity to experiment with
a variety ofleaming techniques. The Program also includes a week-long summer
program conducted prior to the beginning of the first year of law school.
Participants in this program are exposed to traditional law school classes, legal
skills training, and individual and group learning environments that are designed
to introduce the participants to the academic rigors of law school.
Two of the students interviewed for this study also participated in the six
week summer institute operated by the Council on Legal Education Opportunity
("CLEO"). CLEO is a national program that provides a "preview of the law
school experience . .. [to] socially and economically disadvantaged college
graduates" who are interested in attending law school. The CLEO program
"includes courses derived from the first year law school curriculum, emphasizing
legal methods and techniques while focusing extensively on abstract thinking,
legal analysis and synthesis." COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUC . OPPORTUNITY, ALL
ABOUT CLEO (1995) .
s Inter views with participants occurred on Sept. 6, Sept. 13, and Nov. 6,
1995.
Pena, 115 S.
6 In their dissenting opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
.
Ct. 2097 (1995), Justices Stevens and Ginsberg noted: "[T]he term 'affirmative
action' is common and well understood. Its presence in everyday parlance shows
that people understand the difference between good intentions and bad." Id. at
2121. The author believes, however, that the more accurate meaning of the term
"affirmative action" has been lost and replaced by individual impressions, not of
what a ffinnative action is but of how affirmative action affects people's lives.
As a result, for the purp ses of this Article, the term affirmative action shall
have the following definition:

�
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uncomfortable when the subject of atlinnativc a ction was raised, and
disassociated themselves when the topic

was

discussed. This subtle

disassociation began to separate the group along racial boundaries. As a

result, the focus of the qualitative investigation, and this Article, was
modified to incorporate the students' views on the intersection of race,
gender and affinnative action.
I.
A.

FINDINGS

Tokenism

nnative
Many jurists and commentators question the viability of affi
ants
action programs7 because of the resulting perception that the particip
e
are intellectually and academically inferior. Several of the students w_
ir
the
interviewed were eager to challenge this perception and to discuss
ed
own struggle to come to terms with the role affirmative action has play
in their lives. At the subject law school, as with most American Bar
ount
Association accredited law schools' white women and minorities acc
for a small percentage of the total student population. 8 The w omen

sitive
The broader societal concept of affirmative action encom pass es any po
tu s
effort by business or educational institutions to advance the employment sta
of target groups. In the words of one scholar:

Affmnative action can be defined as attempts to make progr ess toward
substantive, rather than merely formal, equality of opportuni ty for tho se
y
groups, such as women or racial minorities, which are curre�tl
g
n
underrepresented in significant positions in society, by explicitl y taki
into account the defining characteristic- sex or race- which ha s been
the basis for discrimination.
VE
SUSAN D. CLAYTON & FAYE J. CROSBY, JUSTICE, GENDER AND AFFIRMATI

ACTION 3 (1992).
/
7 See generally Ken Feagins, Wanted - Diversity: White Heterosexua
r
fo
s
gue
Males Need Not Apply, 4 WIDENER J. Pus. L. 1 (1994). Feagin s ar
of an
elimination of race-based group affirmative action preferenr,es in favor
nned
individualized application of preferences to "minorities who have been ba
oda 
by the perpetuation of purposeful discrimination " and "reasonable acc otllIIl
sed
-ba
tion for qualified white males who are harme as a result of minority
ti
a ve
classifications." Id. at 46. He asserts that modifications to existing affirm
a
action programs will eliminate the resentment that white males experien c e as
result of race-based preferences. See also P aul D. Carrington, Diversity!, I99Z
sed
UT AH L. REv. 1105 (discussing negative implications of race and gen de r ba

d

affirmative action quotas in higher education)..
8 Fall 1994 Law School attendance fi gures for ABA-Approve d LaW
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SILENT BENEFICIARIES

1995-96]

interviewed in this study all agreed that their limited numbers raise
presumptions about their intellectual abilities among their male counter
parts. Commentators have observed that male students require some
tangible evidence of intellectual competence in order to justify the
presence of the white women and minorities in law school. In the absence
of such justification, the men simply dismiss them

as

"affirmative action babies." Several students spoke with

"tokens"9 o r
an

underlying

degree of anger about the necessity to overcome this presumption:
I would rather them group me ... and get the extra help and then g o
ahead and get my grades. Okay, if you are going to label me as a token,
I might

as

well be a good one

as

far

as

that. Of course everybody has

different views, like oh, gosh, I wish I didn't have to come in this
program, but you might as well take the help, that's the way I figure
and do what you have to do.

Schools indicates that 128,989 students were enrolled in juris doctor programs,
including 55,808 women, and 24,611 minorities. The minority group classifica
tion includes students who identify themselves as Black, not of Hispanic Origin;
American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian Pacific Islander; Mexican-American;
Puerto Rican; and Other Hispanic American. A REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION
IN

THE UNITED STATES FALL 1994 (Rich L. Morgan, American Bar Association

Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar ed., 1994). It is important
to note that minority women are counted in enrollment figures for both minority
students and for women. Telephone Interview with Rick Morgan, Data Specialist,
American Bar Association (Apr. 23, 1996).
9

See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at

One Ivy League Law School,

143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994). Professor Guinier

notes that the perception of women
performance:

as

tokens has a detrimental impact on their

Our claim is that the proportional scarcity of "elite women" sets u p a
dynamic of virtual tokenism, in which the more numerically significant
women students are nevertheless treated as , or self-identify as , "tokens."
This dynamic exists in both the manifest and latent structure of the Law
School, as well as in both the actual treatment of female students and
their perception of their treatment by male students and faculty. As with
true tokens, the dynamic of virtual tokenism reinforces limitations on
the opportunity for success of women law students. Also similar to true
tokens, many female students at the Law School enter the institution
with identical credentials and then differentiate significantly from their

�ale peers in terms of academic achievement, voluntary class participa
tion, and interaction with faculty.
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
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I don't want people to think I'm just here because I'm a woman.
I ignore it, even I thought it. If somebody is going to pull that crap, I
wouldn't think about, I wouldn't allow it to keep popping in my head
even if I really kind of deep down thought it, that's irrelevant, we 're all
here now. It's kind of like you walk in after you get in and the slate's
clean. Your scores mean nothing, your GPA [Grade Point Average]
means nothing. You just walk in here and it's like you're the same until
the first semester grades come out and you get ranked all over again. So
it's kind of like, well who cares how I got in, I got in, I'm just as good
as you now. ...

One of the white female students interviewed in this study discussed
"tokenism" as a function of age, not gender. When asked whether she
perceived herself as a token, she replied:
No, no. There are lots of females. I'm obviously the oldest. I hope I'm
not here for that reason. I hope that's not it. It does kind of make, not
make me feel bad but make me . . . it has a negative effect. If someone
would tell me that I was here for that reason it would kill me. For
someone to think that I didn't have the academic ability and they just
let me in because they needed an older woman, it would just kill me.

B.

Stigma

When the fonnal academic support program at the subject law sch ool
g th e
was implemented in 1994, the faculty members adm inis terin
a
program assumed that participation in th e program would imp ose
double stigma10 on the students, based in part on their existing status as

10

See generally City of R ichmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,

4 3
488 U.S. 469, 9

ger of
( 1978) (plurality opinion) ("Classifications based on race carry a dan

m�Y
stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they
ia l
ac
r
of
in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to politics

78)

hostility."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1 9
n on
(plurality opinion) ("Preferential programs may only reinforce conu
out
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success with
orth.");
special protection based on a factor having no relation to i ndividual w
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., diss entin g) ("A
ss
segregated admissions process creates suggestions of stigma and cas te no l�
ts
i
te
than a segregated classroom, and in the end it may produce that result despi
contrary intentions.").
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11

or gender-based minority groups, and in part
members of racial
because of their participation in the program. After numerous discussions
about the issue of stigma, the law school faculty administering the

program concluded that their a bility to address the imposition of stigma
was

at best limited, and more realistically, nonexistent.12 As a result, the

faculty decided to address any problems on a case-by-case basis, and
hope that the students were mature enough to respond appropriately to
any problems. Although this

laissez-faire

approach was most expedient

for the faculty members, the students were left to make their own
decisions about their response to the stigma

associated with their

participation in the program:

11

See generally John K. Wilson, The Myth of Reverse Discrimination in

ffigher Education, l 0 J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC.

90 (Winter 1995-1996)

(attributing the stigma associated with affirmative a c tion programs to an ongoing
perception that unqualified Blacks have been the recipients of educational
benefits at the expense of white males). Wilson states that:
There is no doubt that affirmative action often stigmatizes those who
benefit from it, but mainly this is because the myth of reverse discrimi
nation denigrates the abilities of minorities. Minorities admitted to elite
colleges or hired for top faculty positions are widely presumed to be
unqualified beneficiaries of an undeserved preference. The fact that the
charge is untrue does not always mitigate the harmful effects it
produces, from minorities doubting their own

abilities to racist

assumptions about them by others. But it is racism, not affirmative
action, that stigmatizes minorities.
ld. at 90.
12

See AN INTRODUCTION TO ACADEMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, LAW
SCHO OL ADMISSION SERVICES ( 1992) (concluding that the stigma associated with
the selected for participation in a cademic support programs can not be eliminat

ed, but can be addressed by law schools that acknowledge that value of
affirmative action,
[w]here academic institutions demonstrate a clear commitment to
provide the highest quality education experience to students with special
needs, and place a high value on the type of education provided in a
sound academic assistance program - that is, a carefully constructed,
logically developed curriculum tailored to enhance individual student
strengths and remedy individual student deficiencies - the stigma that
may attach to the experience will be diminished. On the other hand,
support program students who receive more individualized education
serv ices than the mainstream will more likely consider themselves
stigmatized when faced with institutional ambivalence toward the
academic assistance that they receive.
Id. at

5).
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I felt like I let myself down. Like I was so concerned about, like
emb arrasis ng myself. Now I don't know why, it seemed silly, but I was
traumatized by the whole thing and I felt like I kind've sneaked into the
room one afternoon a week. No one in the group really talked about
anything outside of the group. I never told any of my friends that I was
doing it and they all talked about it but I just felt really strange about
the whole thing, but now I realize that was kind've silly and I would
encourage everyone not to feel that way.
I guess what was runni ng across my mind is that when other people see
us c oming to these academic .. . programs, what are they going to
think? Do they automatically put group names on people who are
attending these classes, oh, she's here because she is this, or she's here
because she's female, or she is here because she is Black and she needs
us to help her out? So I just wonder how other people perceive the
group that goes, and I mean, personally I don't care ....
I still think about it sometimes. I still feel like since I was participating
in the [summer academic support program], I think about it, I mean. I
kind of try to compare like what people who weren't in the program,
how they are doing and how they are understanding with what I'm
doing now and I just wonder if I'm up to par a lot of time.But I still
think about that sometimes, that I'm not as quite as smart as I thought
I was when I first came in. I wasn't full of myself but I'd worked really
hard in undergrad and I sacrificed a lot of fun times for studying and
I felt like that I had a 4.0 every single semester of my college career
except for one and I just felt like I was the smartest person or next to
the smartest person in the class.I guess when I was put in the, invited
to the program that it kind of, it made me feel a little funny and it m ade
me think well maybe I'm not as smart as I always thought I was or
maybe I was fooling myself and I was only memorizing and not really
actually gaining knowledge.

I don't have a problem with it. I don't care who knows ... if this
program actually ends up being a help to all of us, they're going to
wish they had been in there and they're going to be like, "that's not fair
because you had this and I didn't and that's the reason you did better
than me on this." I don't care. I'll tell them if they ask me, I don't care.
And I don't think we're stigmatized as far as the fact that we're in this
we
program because I think if the admissions committee didn't think
pt
were qualified or dido't think we could make it, why would they acce
d.
tan
us into the university in the first place.So, that's pretty much my s

1995-96)
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added advantage kind of like [another student).

It's kind of like sacred but I don't mind telling anyb ody.

One student spoke very candidly about the stigma she felt because of
the racial composition of the academic support program. The stigma this
student associated with the program was so significant that after attending
the first meeting, she refused to participate in the program:
When l walked in that classroom and saw who was in there, I felt a
stigma ... Well, it just made me feel like, why was I picked, just
because of the assortment of people who were there . .. I was
wondering why all of us were picked. What, like, did we, was our GPA
something different or were we all stupid, you know. I don't know, but
that's the way l felt. I don't know. Prejudice on my part ... walking
into that room didn't strike me as being the best and the brightest,
looking at the people who were there. Just a general impression, not a
fact.

She recalled that there were about fifteen students in attendance at the
first meeting. This student described the group as "[m]inorities, either
age-wise or color or someone who had been out of school for a long time
or a while." Because of the group's composition, she recalled feeling
"like I had been picked out as one of the dumb ones and it did make me
wonder what the criteria was." During the interview of this student, it
was clear that the stigma she experienced has negatively influenced her
law school experience.
Another student noted that the stigma associated with the program
was the result of the identification of some students by the faculty as
specifically in need of academic support. Instead, the student advocated
a program that would be open to all students on a voluntary basis:
If it's across the board well then they would think that there is a study
group for people and I'll stay in ifl need it. If it's a voluntary study
group. If you feel like you need extra help come. Because if they say
it's because I identified myself in my personal statement wouldn't that
be what I was doing anyway, I would be saying that I need extra help.
So offer it to everyone and if I was a person who would have identified
myself on a personal statement well then I'm just identifying myself a
step later. Isn't that really, I mean how can they say that you have
identified myself when I thought I was getting a scholarship. And so,
if it is supposed to be because I identified myself well then, let
everyone have the opportunity to identify themselves knowingly. Not

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
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because something was said identifying yourself as wanting to be in a
study group. There may have been something about would you be
willing to be in a study group. Well, sure, I'll check that, yeah. But I
don't want to be in a study group at school because I won't do well.
You know, who needs that pressure.

Vocal opposition to affirmative action came from one biracial student
who views affinnative action

as

to o stigmatizing. The biracial student

noted that:
I guess I don't hold the popular view, I think minorities and women
will always be in law school regardless of affirmative action, there are
a lot of bright, articulate women out there, minorities and I think we
can still do it, you know without the affirmative action. Personally, I
know this is going to sound awful, I don't like affirmative action to a
certain extent because every time people blame it, it's like a crutch for
them, to say you're here because of affirmative action and I always had
the feeling if it's not there they can't blame it on anything, I'm here

because I'm qualified. Maybe I have my head in the sand, I don't know.

I don't see how men and women are unequal, I don't see it, we are all
here for the same goals and I think we are all part of a equal field.
Maybe I'm wrong, maybe I'm totally blind.

C.

Concerns Regarding Legal Challenges to Affirmative Action
Program s
1.

Race-based Affirmative Action Programs

�

The question that provoked the most open and frank discuss on
addressed the students' views on the decline of affirmative a ction
initiatives in law school admissions and retention programs. It was �ot
ssi ng
�ex�ected th�t the students divided along racial lines when discu
is issue. Without exception, the Black students acknowledged the
importance of affirmative action programs in law scho o ls13 and ex-

�

13 See generally Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action
ction
Whom?, 4? STAN. L. REv. 855
(1995) (examining the role that affirmative a
ged
pro�s can play to ameliora
te the circumstances of a number of disadvanta
racial an� ethnic groups, including
ric�,
African Americans, Latinos , Asian AI11e
in
and Nati e Am�ricans); Alex
M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas
:
3
04
AJ]irmative Acti n: Attackin
1
o
g Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.

f0'
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pressed concerns over recent court decisions that seem to predict th e
elimination of affirmative action programs:
Definitely, yes. I really do believe it. That's one of the reasons that I'm
here. Well I think that when I first looked into going to law school I
said this is one of the issues that I wanted to fight for but it looks that
as though by the time I get out of law school I'll be fighting to get it
back. I mean, you know, it's just it would definitely have a profound
effect, I believe. and it worries me because I just don't think that we'll
get that chance to prove ourselves if affirmative action is eliminated that
we have now. And I just worry about future generations. I worry about
my sister coming after me. How is 1t going to be for her. It's something
I think about pretty much daily actually.
It kind of angers me and it's a little frightening because it's like okay,
affinnative action this year. what's next. It's like these white males are
in power and it's like a disease, like what is going to stop them, you
know. There is no vaccine or something. It's like, they were getting
more and more power taken away, something that was meant to bring
about a bit more evenness to give some people a chance that they w o n't
have otherwise. Yeah, it bothers me. I kind of feel helpless about it.

One theme underlying the comments expressed by all of the students
interviewed for this study was the impres sion that affirmative action
p rograms

are

primarily race-based, not gender-based, initiatives. Since

this perception was so pervasive among the study participants, this Article
will explore the constitutional treatment and pr otection afforded to race
and gender-based classifications that serve as the framework upon which
the views of the students participating in this study were formed. Since
its decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 14 the

(advocating the implementation of mandatory quotas or nwnerical goals in the
admission of minorities to institutions of higher education because notwithstand
ing the visibility of successful Black lawyers, and myths about the success of
affirmative action, Blacks are still underrepresented in the legal profession).

14 438 U.S. 265 ( 197 8 ) ( plurality opinion) (holding that race-based medical
school admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment). The inability of the Supreme Court to reach a
consensus opinion in this case leaves open the question of whether institutions

�

of higher education may consider race as a constitutionally pennissib e factor f� r
the purpose of recruiting and retaining a diverse student body. This author ts
currently developing an article that will thoroughly examine this issue, and the
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United States Supreme Court has applied an increasingly exacting
standard of constitutional

review to

race-based

affirmative

action

programs, but has remained inexplicably silent regarding the constitution
ality of gender-based affirmative action programs. This is a difficult
concept to accept, especially when white women, who may not be
detrimentally affected by the elimination of certain affirmative action
programs, challenge the importance or fairness of race-based programs.
The uncertainty surrounding the continuation of affirmative action
programs for women and minorities in higher education fosters the
students' perception that the composition of law school classes in the
future will not resemble the diversity that is c haracteristic of our
society.15
As one student noted:
Well, basically it makes me angry that they're going to take up or are
trying to take away affirmative action because you can look at the

number of women and minorities that are here in the law school and

you can tell that as far as Black people this was the biggest class we've
had and as far as women there are less women here. And if, you know,

if they take that away I just have the feeling that i t is going to be all

white men . . . becau�e you have people who are racist who are in

power as well and they will use their power to keep people out. And I

think this is one of those things that gives those underprivileged people
who didn't have an opportunity to actually get an opportunity to get the

chance. I think the number is going to decrease rapidly. It's not just the

law school, it's everywhere.

The Black law students in this study expressed legiti mate co ncerns
that l w schools will revert to havens for privileged white males as the
� .
.
constitutional review of race-based preferences beco mes mo re exactmg.
As recently as 1995, the United States Supreme Court, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, held that the United States Constitution's
cert.
si�ficance of the decision in
Hopwood v. Texas 78 F.3d 932 (5th C ir. ),
deme , 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) an
n and
d its impact n race-based admiss io
reten on criteria in legal edu
cation .
�!
.The levels of racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in law schools todaY are
of
a relatively recent pheno
menon. For a history of the gradual integration
o en and minorities in legal
IN,
education, see generally CY T IA FUC HS EPSTE
N H
E
IN LAW 49- 59 (2d ed. 1993); J. C
Y MT
JR. EMANCIPATION: TH

�

�;
MA::

�

LA S I H ,
,
r
THE BLACK LAWYER 18 44-1 944 ( 1 993 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW
);
SCHOOL·.
EGAL EDUCATION IN
9S3) ·
AMERICA FROM 1850s TO THE 198 0S (l
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guarantee of equal protection1r. requires the court to apply the "strictest
judicial scrutiny" to any race-based classifications imposed by federal,
state or local governments.1 - The strict scrutiny analysis requires a
proponent of race-based a flirmative action programs to "show that its
purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial,
and that use of the classification is ·necessary ...to the accomplishment'
of [the proponent's] purpose or the safeguarding of its interests." 18

Application of the strict scrutiny analysis to these programs is an almost
insurmountable hurdle to overcome.

In Adarand, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality19 of the

Department of Tra nsportation s
' ("DOT') practice of awarding additional
compensation to general contractors if the contractors "hired subcontrac
as

tors certified

small businesses controlled by 'socia lly and econ omically

disadvantaged individuals.'

"20

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of DOT s
' motion for summary

16

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,

in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; ... nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
amend.XIV, § 1.

CONST.

17 Adarand, 115 S . Ct. at 2113.
18 Bakke 438 U.S.at 305 (plurality opinion) (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
,

717, 721-22 (1973)).
19 The plaintiff, Adarand

Constructors, alleged violations of the equal

protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process

Clause, which

provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be ... de prived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.amend.V.See Adarand, 115
S. Ct.at 2105-0 6.
20

Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102. The Court stated that the Small Business

Act
defines "socially disadvantaged individuals" as "those who have been
subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their
identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual
qualities," ...and it defines "economically disadvantaged individuals"
as

"those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete

in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished
capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same
business area who are

not

socially disadvantaged."

Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 63 7(a)(6)(A)).DOT extended the definition of "socially

and economically disadvantaged individuals" to include women, pursuant to the
Surface Transportation and

Uniform

U.S.C. § 101 (1987). Adarand, 115

Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, 23
S. Ct. at 2103.
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judgment.21 The Supreme Court, however, vacated this deci sion, noting
that the Court of Appeals, as a result of its reliance on Fullilove

v.

Klutznick22 and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,23 erroneously applied
a lenient standard of review to determine the constitutionality of DOT's
program. 24 The Supreme Court held

that ..all racial classifications,

imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."25 As a result, the
Court remanded the case for evaluation under the appropriate standard of
review.26
Underlying the Court's application of the strict scrutiny analysis to
race-based affirmative action program s i s the long held treatment of race
as a constitutionally suspect classification. 27 Unlike racial classifications,
gender-based

classifications are

not

constitutionally

suspect,28 and

therefore are not subject to the strict scrutiny analysis that is imposed on
racial clas sifications.
The Supreme Court justifies it s heightened review of race-based
programs by relying on three propositions - skepticism, 29 consisten
cy,30 and congruence.31 These three propo sitions justify the court's

21

Adarand, 11 5 S. Ct. at 2101.

22 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, 42 U.S.C. § 67 01, which required 10% of federal funds for public works

projects go to minority contractors, is constitutional).
23

497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that Federal Communication Commission

minority preference policies do not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
24

Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112.

25

Id. at 2113.

2

Id. at 2118.

6

27

In Bakke, Justice Powell concluded that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions

of any sort are inherently suspect and thus c all for the most exacting judicial
examination." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (plurality opinion).
28

Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982)

(holding that the denial of a male applicant for admission violated equal
protection).
29

Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476

U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) ). Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
majority inAdarand notes that skepticism is inherent in" '[a]ny preference based
on racial or ethnic criteria,' and as such 'must necessarily receive a most
searching examination.'" Id.
30

The concept of consistency requires courts to apply the "strict scrutiny"

test to all race-based classifications. Id.
31

Congruence demands that courts apply the same equal protection analysis
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application of the strict scrutiny test to any equal protection challenge of
race-based classifications. The Supreme Court in Adarand defines the
principle of consistency as "whenever the government treats any person
unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury
that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection. "32 The use of this principle allows the
Court to ignore history and the continued existence of racism in our
society by treating remedial and invidious racial classifications in the
same manner. Although Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in
Adarand notes that "[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful
racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution
there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race,"33 the
Supreme Court has yet to realistically approve a remedial measure that
adequately eliminates the systemic vestiges of slavery and racism that are
pervasive in this society.
Given the narrow parameters within which r ace-based affirmative
action programs may withstand the strict scrutiny a nalysis, this constitu
tional standard has become "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."34 Justice
O'Connor in Adarand notes, however, that although the Court must give
a "detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means,"35 the
Supreme Court would uphold constitutionally permissible race-based

classifications. In order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the reasons
underlying the implementation of race-based affirmative action programs
must be compelling and clearly legitimate. 36 In addition, the remedial
measures imposed by the race-b ased affirmative action program must be
narrowly tailored to address the discriminatory conduct. 37 Althoug h the
current group of Supreme Court justices has yet to address the degree of
historic discrimination that must be established before

race-based

affirmative action programs may be incorporated into the admissions
procedures of law schools,38 the Supreme Court has upheld a race-based

used to challenge a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to challenges brought
under the Fifth Amendment. Id.

32 Id. at 2114.
33 Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
34 Id. at 2117 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)).
3s

Id.

37

Id.

36 Id.
38 The Supreme Court may have an opportunity to consider this issue in the

event that the court grants the writ of certiorari expected to be filed by the
University of Texas at Austin to appeal the Fifth Circuit decision in Hopwood
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affinnative action program initiated to redress over four decades of
"pervasive, systematic, and obstinate" discriminatory hiring practices.39
Implicit in this analysis is the ultimate conclusion that the remedial

benefits of constitutionally pennissible race-based affinnative action
programs will be narrow in scope, limited in number, and have no
appreciable impact on improving the social, economic and political
condition of racial and ethnic minorities.

The curious aspect underlying the principle of consistency is that it
requires the court to apply the strict scrutiny analysis to race-based
classifications affecting Blacks and whites in order to insure that the

constitutional guarantee of equal protection is administered to everyone
in an identical fashion. However, the principle does not account for the
less restrictive intennediate scrutiny analysis afforded to gender-based
classifications.
2.

Gender-based Affirmative Action Programs

Several white women interviewed in the study were interested in the
continuation of affirmative action programs as a means of correcting the
gender inequality currently in existence at the subj ect law school.
One thing that I think will happen is the Good Old Boy network that
was alluded to will come back even stronger, because at least where I'm
from and what I'm used to, ninety-nine percent of all the attorneys in
[my hometown] were white guys, whose dads were attorneys, whose

v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1 996). On March 2 1 , 1 996, in a televised
inte iew with Edie Magnus of CBS This Morning, Dr. Robert Ber��l,
i:
President of the University stated that UT will appeal the Fifth Circuit's dec1s 1on
to the Supreme Court.
S.
39 A darand, 1 1 5 S. Ct.
at 2 1 1 7 (citing United States v. Paradise , 480 U.
l 49, 167 ( 1 ��7) (plurality opinion). In Paradise, the Supreme Court held that
ent of
race-based hmng and promotion quotas imposed
on the Alabama Departm
.
Pubhc Safe to force the hiring and promotio
pport
n of Black troopers and su
�
personnel dtd not violate the Equal
enth
Protection Clause of the Fourte
Amendment. The Supreme Court
case
the
noted that the lower courts in
rily
conclusively determined that "[d]
ssa
iscrimination at the entry level nece
tal
p�ecluded Blac from competing for
n
�
promotions, and resulted in a departme
h er c�y dominated exclusively
he
by nonrninorities." 480 U.S. at 168 . T
� �
di scnmmatory hiring practices identifi
the
ed in Paradise had been utilized by
State of Alabama for over th'
y
trty- seven years before this action was irut1ated b
the NAACP.
·

·

·
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grandfathers were attorneys, whose great-grandfathers were attorneys,
so when little Johnny gets about fifteen, Johnny works as a clerk in the
law office, little Johnny takes the perfect major to get the perfect
resume, has the perfect experience, barn, they start looking at nothing
but paper credentials. I think there's a guy here whose father is a
lawyer in my hometown, you can tell he's been groomed from day one
and I think that's what' s going to happen. Because unfortunately you
don't have a lot of women who can say well my mother was a lawyer,
and my mother's mother was a lawyer. African-Americans see the same
way, I can't think right off the bat of any Black lawyers in [my
hometown], and that's a big town and that's really sad. You're not
going to see the people like you going well, my Dad's an attorney and
my aunt was an attorney and I'm following the tradition. Only people
who have that tradition are white men. If you get away from anything
other than paper credentials you won't see both minority and wom
en . .
.

.

However, some of the white women interviewed in this study were
noticeably indifferent to the impact that s ocial and legal challenges to
affirmative action programs would have on their lives.40 One significant
reason for this indifference may be explained b y the Supreme Court's less
exacting constitutional standard of review for gender-based preferences.
Unlike racial classifications, the Supreme Court applies an intermediate

level of scrutiny when reviewing equal protection challenges to gender
bas ed classifications.41 This lesser standard of review leads to the
curious result that gender-based

preferences

may withstand Equal

Protection challenges, but race-based programs will generally fail.

Another reason for the indifferent response by white women to the
possible elimination of affirmative action programs may be the considerable
academic accomplislunents of the white women applying to law school. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 1 5 , at 5 6:
However, the problem raised by preference for women is unlike the
problem of other minority group preferences because women applicants
have generally been better qualified than men. A 1 972 survey of eight
elite and "semi-elite" law schools revealed that over 53 percent of the
women, compared with only 38 percent of the men, graduated in the top
l 0 percent of their undergraduate institutions. The average law school
admission test (LSAT) score did not vary significantly by sex.
41 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 1 97 ( 1 976) (affirming that gender
classifications are subject to intermediate level scrutiny).
40
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To withstand constitutional challenge, gender-based classifications

must "seive important government objectives and must be substantially

related to achievement of those objectives.''42 This intermediate standard,

although substantial, can be sustained where the gender-based classifica

tion "intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened. " 43

As noted by

Justice O 'Connor in

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,44 a classification is imper

missible if its underlying purpose is to foster archaic and stereotypical

notions.45 In Hogan,46 the Court struck down a statute excluding men

from a state-supported professional nursing school upon concluding that

an admission restriction favoring women was unnecessary in the already
female-dominated nursing profession. 47 The Court noted that a statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause "if the statuto ry objective is to

exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are presumed
to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior . . . . ' '48
Courts have taken the view that laws should not overly burden
women by trying to protect them. In Associated General Contractors, Inc.

v. City and County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit noted that "(a]

thin line divides governmental actions that help correct the effects of
invidious discrimination from those that reinforce the hannful notion that
the women need help because they can't make
a difficult task, however, to locate that line.

it on their own.''49 It is

The weakness in the principle of consistency announced by the

Adarand50 decision becomes apparent in cases like Associated General

�

Contractors where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalida ed

the race-based component of an ordinance that established an affinnat1ve

action plan for women and minorities, but sustained the gender-based

42

Id. See also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 4 58 U.S. 7 1 8 , 724

t to
( 1 982) (reiterating the application of the intermedia
te level scrutiny tes
gender-based classifications).

: Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 728.
Id.
Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.

45

at 718.

at 729.
at 733.
at 728-33.

at 725 .
8 1 3 F.2d 922, 940 (9th Cir.
ity
1 987) (holding that a provision of a c
ordin�ce that gave preference to mino
al
rity-owned businesses violated the Equ
Protection Clause, . but provisions
wned
that gave preJ.
&:
erence to tiemale-o
.
businesses were facially valid under an
.
equal protection ana1ys1s
· ).
so
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 1 1 5 s. Ct . 209 7, 2 1 1 1 ( 1 95
9 ).
•

49
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Justices Stevens and

Ginsberg in their dissenting opinion in Adarand:
If this remains the law, then today' s lecture about ' consistency' will
produce the anomalous result that the government can more easily enact
affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination against women
than it can enact affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination
against African-Americans - even though the primary purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause52 was to end discrimination against the former
slaves. . . . When a court becomes preoccupied with abstract stan

dards, it risks sacrificing common sense at the altar of formal consisten
cy.s3

51

Associated General Contractors, 8 1 3 F.2d at 94 1 .

52

For an examination of racism and sexism in the historic development of

constitutional equal protection rights for women and Blacks under the Fourteenth
Amendment, see generally Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination:

A Historical Case for Equal Treatment Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL 'y 89 ( 1 994). It is important to note that affirmative

action legislation was not originally applicable to women. As originally drafted,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts prohibited discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, or national origin. After heated debate, the final version signed
into law included a prohibition against gender discrimination as well. Thereafter
on September 24, 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order No. 1 1 ,246,
3 C.F.R. 339 ( 1 964-65), which prohibited the federal government and its
contractors from engaging in employment discrimination because of "race, creed,
color, or national origin" and required them to take affirmative steps to insure
the equitable treatment of all workers. Two years later, Johnson issued Executive
Order No. 1 1 ,375, 3 C. F.R. 684 ( 1 966-70), which amended Executive Order No.
1 1 ,246 by including sex as a protected classification.

Executive Order No.

1 1 ,375 provides, in pertinent part: "It is the policy of the United States
Government to provide equal opportunity in federal employment and in
employment by federal contractors on the basis of merit and without discrimina
tion because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." RACIAL PREFERENCE
AND RACIAL JUSTICE app. F (Russell Nieli ed., 1 990).

For a good discussion of this issue, see CLAYTON & C ROSBY, supra note 6,
at 1 3 ; Alice Kemler-Harris, Feminism and Affirmative Action, in DEBATING
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 70-7 1 (Nicolaus Mills ed. , 1 994).
53

Adarand, 1 1 5 S. Ct. at 2 1 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Ensley

Branch NAACP v. City of Birmingham, 3 1 F . 3 d 1 548, 1 579 ( 1 994) ("While it
may seem odd that it is now easier to uphold affirmative action programs for
women than for
racial minorities, Supreme Court precedent compels that
result.").
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The judiciary's quest for consistency has placed men and women on an
equal constitutional footing. The Supreme Court' s consistency approach
does not, however, extend to the constitutional treatment of white women
and Blacks. Until such time as the Supreme Court reconciles this
paradoxical situation, this issue will continue to be a source of social,
4
economic, and political conflict between white women and Blacks. 5
D.

Elimination of Affirmative Action Programs in Law Schools

The most ardent disapproval of affirmative action programs was
expressed by the two white women55 who refused to participate in the
academic support programs. One student noted that she does not think
"people who don't have the ability should take the place of someone who
does have the ability." She indicated that i n the absence of affinnative
action goals at the subject law school, the composition of the law school
student body would be very different. Although she refused to identify
those students who, in her opinion, lacked the requisite capabilities, she

stated that "I can pick out a few who wouldn 't be here." The other white
student made an effort to reconcile her ambivalent feelings about this
issue:
I can tell you what the cases say. But I think that affirmative action is
a bad answer to a worse problem. I think that the ramifications of
affirmative action I mean, you know, one of the reasons we have it is
because of misconceptions about a race or about a sex or whatever,
these people are barred because of past historical or whatever but now
we're just changing the stigma. We're just changing evils now. We
think, maybe we're just keeping the same stigma. A woman couldn 't do
it if she was to do it on her own merit. A Black person couldn' t do it
if they did it on their own merit. I think a lot of white males and maybe
ld
even some, I don't know what everyone,
maybe that's what the wor
.
. l'
·"'
a
'
54 For a d.1scuss1on of racial tensions among study participants, see m
notes 55-56 and accompanyi
ng text.
g
55 It has been suggeste
d that there are psychological reasons for the groWUl
at
6,
attacks n affinnative action
?
programs. CLAYTON & CROSBY, supra note
.

nd

24 (noting that

a
" . · · the vehemence with which some white women
of
p�op e f �olor · · argue
s
m
ti
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·
?
again st program s designed to help the
d1scnmmation may i
. .
yth of
n Part denve from a defe . ve addicti
on to the m
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perceives it as that we have to give them equal opportunities inclination
because they can't do it on their own. I don't know that we're helping
the situation any, but then again, what if we didn't have affirmative
action? What would motivate people to overcome their own stereotyping
and their own prejudices? Why would they suddenly bring a woman
into law school if they know such and such man who's been the head
of this finn and he has a son who wants to go to law school and I can
go and play golf with him and why would they accept a woman? They
would be perfectly fine with only men. And then why would whites
suddenly let in Blacks, for so long they have believed were not as
qualified. So really it has to be and then, to even the playing ground
because it hasn't been even for so long but then I think we are making
some sad tradeoffs also. That's my perception. I don't know if that is
right or wrong. I don't think it's out the door because many thinking
people, hopefully, will realize that we have to keep something intact
because we're only thirty years since the revolution really. Why would
thirty years overcome hundreds of years of past discrimination . . . But
I don't know that it is the complete be and end all, perfect resolution
that we really need.
The aforementioned white female students also argued that academic

support programs do not belong in law school, and should fall under the
anti-affirmative action

ax:

If you have been accepted to law school well really then isn't that all
that was needed. Once you're here you may be the last one student in
class but you need to be able to pass your classes and if you can't then
why were you accepted. And then you think that maybe we need to be
getting people through law school and this is horrible of me to say that
I don't think the law is to be getting people through law school. The
law is to be making lawyers and if they can do it in class then they'll
do it and they'll do it in the world but if you're, but how else did you
get into law school. You should have been qualified to get here before
you got here to some degree. Now how affirmative action works in with
that, that doesn't mean you're not qualified simply because you, you
know, I may have been a poor [rural] student who didn't do the best
grades at [a small, local college] or wherever and then we say, well
we're going to let that person in anyway but we expect that they should
keep up with everyone else in class. And maybe that requires working
harder but that's your job isn't it. If you want to go to law school, we
all had to work hard. Maybe I have something, maybe I wasn't in the
retention program, maybe there was something in my background that
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really impedes my learning ability, you know, something. Maybe I 've
been out of school for whatever years. Maybe I didn't do well. I know
students who didn't do well in undergrad who got on probation . . . and
who

are

not in the academic program and they didn't do as well as I

did. How

are

they choosing these people, that's what I want to know.

How did we get selected. . . but I bet you could ask any of them to
identify themselves for a learning program they thought they were
identifying themselves for someone who could be good in law school.
You know, and so I wonder what is their role here. But if you are going
to have them, if someone does disagree with me and says, yes, I think
we need something for students who can't do well then it needs to be
voluntary and it needs to be, everyone should be given the option . . . .
Isn't that really the, that's the goal and you haven't stigmatized anyone.
You haven't said to anyone, "We as an institution that has been here for
years know that you might not do well." You have people coming to
law school saying I'm challenged more than anyone else because it is
so hard. This class must be harder for me than it is for anyone else in
class. They had such a good answer in class, I could never have thought
of that. I mean, why, and you feel immediately that you could not do
well. If you need to make it voluntary across the board and then people
will drop out if they don't need it. And if they need it, they stay in.
Well wasn't that the goal.

One of the white women, who has become very good friends with
several of the minority students in the academic support program,
expressed some ambivalence about pennitting affirmative action to have
an

impact on the admissions process:
Well, I look at this from two sides because I don't know how big a role
that plays here at the law school, but I know that not everybody comes
from the same opportunities and it isn't fair to keep somebody out
because they don't have the chance to prove themselves first just

enough to get in. But I know from just talking about LSAT [Law
School Aptitude Test] scores and GPA's that the girl that I was closest

w
to in undergrad, she didn't make it in
and she was white and I kno
d
that her scores were higher than some
of my Black friends that I talke
to and it hurts me that she didn't
y
get in and we don't get to stud

together and I never see her
s
anymore but I understand that it'
necessary because not everybo
dy has had the opportunities to prove
themselves first. So as far as
that goes I wish she could have gotten in.
.
feel tke
get
she got knocked out but I know
that the people who did
10 are Just as worthy
as she is. Maybe they didn't have the same chanc e

�

�
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but I guess I'm just tom because I understand, I see both sides but it
still hurts a little bit because I know she would have done really well
too. So I can't say that I ' m, I guess I ' m straddling the fence but I can ' t
help it because I see it from both sides. I know i t is necessary but it
hurts me that it does knock other people out too.

The concerns of the Black women participants regarding the possible
elimination of race-based affirmative action programs were expressed by

a third-year student who noted that:
Well, there is the CLEO program fighting for its life. And as soon as
I heard the decisions6 come down, the big one this summer I was like,
well. I immediatel y thought about CLEO and we discussed it out at
work because, you know, the retention programs and all they are
basically geared toward women and people who are disadvantaged
according to the Supreme Court these days that is discrimination and it
will probably be out the door pretty soon.

With the exception of Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke,51 the
constitutional legitimacy of using race-based preferences in higher edu
cation recruitment and retention efforts has never been fully addressed by
the Supreme Court. However, it is interesting to note that in two separate
actions, white women have sought to eliminate race-based affirmative
action program s from the law school admission process.
In

raised

Henson
an

v.

University of Arka.nsas,58

equal protection

a white, female applicant

challenge to the

preference admission system. In

Henson, which

law school's minority
is a pre-Bakke decision,

the University of Arkansas School of Law established a special admission
category for minority students who were not admitted under two other
categories that focused on prediction indexes

and state residency

considerations. 59 The standard for admission of minority students under
the special category was based on a subjective determination of whether

s6 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1 1 5 S. Ct. 2097, 2 1 1 2- 1 7 ( 1 995)
(holding that all racial classifications are to be analyzed under a strict scrutiny
standard, and that a racial classification will only pass constitutional muster if it
is a specific measure advancing compelling government interests).
57

58
59

438 U.S. 265 ( 1 978) (plurality opinion).
5 1 9 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1 975).

Id. at 577.
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they had a "reasonable likelihood" o f success in law school. 60 The
plaintiff raised an equal protection challenge to the use of the special
minority admission category. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court 's dismissal of the action after an evidentiary hearing on the merits
1
of the case. 6 The court never addressed the equal protection argument
because it detennined that the plaintiff was not injured by the law
school's minority preference admission system because she could not
establish ''that it was the application o f those policies to her that kept her
out of Law School, and that but for those policies she would have been
n62

admItt
• ed . . . .
In the more famous case of Hopwood

v.

Texas,63 an unsuccessful

white female law school applicant, together with several unsuccessful
white male appl icants, raised equal protection challenges to the University
of Texas School of Law's affirmative action program. 64 In Hopwood,
the School of Law established special admissions criteria for minority
students in an effort to remedy past discrimination in Texas ' public
higher education system and increase the number of minority students
enrolled in law school.65 Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged several
components of the law school's 1 992 admissions program. One compo
nent of the program differentiated between the scores for presumptive
admits and denials based on minority and nonminority status. 66 Another
component of the program permitted a minority subcommittee of the
Admissions Committee to review applications from minorities that fell
within a discretionary zone. 67 Although the School of Law did not
establish quotas, the school acknowledged admissions targets or aspira
tions of ten percent Mexican-American students and five percent Black
students, subject to the quality of the applicant pool. 68 The School of
Law indicated that "[t]hese numbers reflect an effort to achieve

60
61
62
63

an

Id.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 578.
861 F. Supp. 5 5 1 (W.D. Tex. 1 994), rev 'd and remanded, 78 F.3d 932

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 1 6 S. Ct. 258 1 ( 1 996). This author is currently
developing an article that will thoroughly examine the significance of the

Hopwood decisions, and their impact on race-based admissions and retention
criteria in legal education.
64
65

66
67
68

Id. at 553.
Id. at 556-62.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 561 -62.
Id. at 563.
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entering class with levels of mi nority enrollment g enerally consistent with
the percentages of Black and Mexican American college graduates."69
The plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of these admissions
targets.
Relying on the Supreme Court ' s decisions in
JA. Croson Co. ,70 and Bakke,11 the trial court in

City of Richmond v.
Hopwood determined

that the School of Law's affirmative action programs utilized race-based
classifications which triggered the appl ication of the strict judicial
scrutiny test under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. 72 The court noted:
The most compelling justification for application of strict scrutiny in
this context is to provide assurance that individual rights are afforded
the full protection they merit under the Constitution. Only by applying
strict scrutiny can a court honestly weigh the validity and necessity of
efforts to remedy past wrongs against the rights of otherwise qualified
nonminorities affected by the efforts. Although the use of racial
classifications is disfavored. there are instances when such classifications
serving proper purposes should be upheld. Only through diligent judicial
examination can a court determine if a classification is consistent with
constitutional guarantees and not related to "illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics."73

The court's appl ication of the strict scrutiny test is a two-pronged
analysis. The state must establish that there is a " 'compelling governmen

tal interest' " served by the program, and that the program is " ' narrowly

tailored to the achievement of that interest. ' "74 The School of Law
introduced its Statement of Policy on Affirmative Action to provide the
compelling interest required under the test.75

69 Id.
10

71

488 U.S. 469, 493 ( 1 989).
438 U.S. 265, 29 1 ( 1 978) (plurality opinion).

72 Hopwood, 8 6 1 F. Supp. at 568.

73 Id. at 569 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).

74 Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 ( 1 986)).
75 Id. at 569-70. The School of Law's Statement of Policy on Affirmative
Action reads :
To achieve the School of Law's mission of providing a first class legal
education to future leaders of the bench and bar of the state by offering
real opportunities for admission of the two largest minority groups in
Texas, Mexican Americans and African Americans; To achieve the
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The court concluded: "Although [the policy statements] are important
76
and laudable goals, the law school's efforts, to be consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause, must be limited to seeking the educational
benefits that flow from having a diverse student body and to addressing
77
the present effects of past discriminatory practices. " As a result, the
court held that the law school's interest in "obtaining the educational
"78
benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse student body,
coupled with its remedial efforts to overcome past discrimination in the
University of Texas system and the Texas educational system as a whole
79
was a compelling enough governmental interest.
Notwithstanding the compelling governmental interest underlying the
0
law school's affirmative action program, 8 the court concluded that the
program violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not narrowly

diversity of background and experience in its student population
essential to prepare students for the real world functioning of the law
in our diverse nation; To assist in redressing the decades of educ ational
discrimination to which African Americans and Mexican Americans
have been subjected in the public school systems of the State of Texas;
To achieve compliance with the 1983 consent decree entered with the
Office ofCivil Rights of the Department of Education imposing specific
requirements for increased efforts to recruit African American and
Mexican American students; To achieve compliance with the American
Bar Association and the American Association of Law Schools
standards of commitment to pluralist diversity in the law school's
student population.
Id. at 570.

It is interesting to note that District Judge Sparks ' decisi on in Hopw�od
seems to be compelled by law, not personal conviction. He notes that "[n] otwtth·
standing the pe onal views of this judge, it appears the goal of increas �g the
�
.
not
number of mmonty
members in the legal profession and j udiciary of Texas is
eenth
a legally sufficient reason to
justify racial preferences under fourt
ame
ent analysis." Id. at 570 n.56.
�
5, 1 4
Id. at 570. See Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v . Bakke, 438 U.S. 26 �
( 1 978) (plurality opi on) "Ethnic
ent in
diversity, however, is only one elem
�
�
range of factors a umvers1ty
properly may consider in attaining the goal
Cir.
heterogeneous student bod
y.")·' Podbersky v. Kirwan, 9 56 F. 2d 52' 57 (4th
1 991) ("The Supreme Court
e may
has declared that in some situations the Stat
e�ac� a rac�-exclusionary
past
remedy in an attempt to eliminate the effects o f
.
discnmmatio
n. ") .
1s
79 Ropwood, 86 1 F. Supp.
at 570.
Id. at 570-73.
80
Id. at 573.
76

�

0�

:
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tailored enough to achieve the law schoo l ' s goal s . 8 1 The court concluded
that "[t]he constitutional infirmity of the 1 992 l aw school admissions
procedure, therefore, is not that it gives preferential treatment on the basis
of race but the test fail s to afford each individual applicant a comparison
with the entire pool of applicants, not just those of the appl icant ' s own
race."s2
In a recent decision,83 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected the District Court ' s conclusion that the School of Law ' s
admissions policies were justifi ed by compelling governmental interests.
The Fifth Circuit held that the goal of achieving diversity through race
based affirmative action initiatives was constitutionally impermissible.84
As a result of this holding, the court found that it was not necessary to
address the second prong of the strict scrutiny test to determine whether
the remedial measures in the law school ' s affirmative action plan were
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.85 The appellate
court noted that "any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school
for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."86 In addition to concluding
that race-based classifications serve to stigmatize their recipients, the Fifth
Circuit asserted that
the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher education contra
dicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection. Diversity
fosters, rather than minimizes, the use of race. It treats minorities as a
group, rather than as individuals. It may further remedial purposes but,
just as likely, may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus fueling
racial hostility. 87

In so doing, the court explicitly rejected the proposition advanced by

Justice Powell in his plurality opinion in

Bakke

that the use of racial

justifications to achieve a diverse student body "is a constitutionally
pennissible goal for an institution of higher education."88 In rej ecting

81
82
83

( 1 99 6).
84

Id. at 573-79.
Id. at 578.

Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 16 S. Ct. 258 1

Id. at 944-48.

85

Id. at 955.
86 Id. at 944.
87

88

Id. at 945.
Id. at 943 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 1 1). The Fifth Circuit notes that

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

968

[VOL. 84

every justification proffered by the School of Law, the Fifth Circuit held
that
the University of Texas School of Law may not use race

as

a factor in

deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student
body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the
law school, to alleviate the law school ' s poor reputation in the minority
community, or to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by
actors other than the law school. 89

In light of Adarand, 90 the Hopwood decisions, and the Supreme
Court's quest for a consistent application of the Equal Protection Clause,
it is doubtful that race-based affirmative action programs will continue to
influence the composition of law school student populations. The
continued impact

of gender-based

affirmative action programs is,

however, a mystery. If consistency is the ultimate goal of the Supreme
Court, then it must reexamine its formalistic approach to the issues of
race and gender. It is clearly inconsistent for the Court to apply a more
relaxed standard of review to gender-based classifications than to race
based classifications. This is especially troublesome when the need for
remedial measures to counter the pervasive impact of racism has not been
eliminated. In the absence of judicial leadership regarding this issue, the
composition of graduate and professional schools will not be representa
tive of the racial and ethnic population of this country.

E.

Affirmative Action

as

a Tool ofDiversity

In addition to being questioned about their opinions on affirmative
action, the students were asked to discuss their concerns about the
continued existence of academic support programs if affirmative action
initiatives are eliminated.91 It was not unexpected that the students

"[n]o case since Bakke has accepted diversity as a compelling state interest under
strict scrutiny analysis." Id. at 944.

89 Id. at 962.

90

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1 1 5 S. Ct. 2097, 2 1 12-13 (1 995). See

supra notes 1 7-39 and accompanying text.

91 In addition to judicial setbacks, affirmative action programs are also being
reevaluated in the political and legislative arenas. Californians are currently
debating the merits of the California Civil Rights Initiative ("CCRI") which is
a legislative initiative designed to "forbid the use of ethnicity or gender 'as a
criterion for either discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to,

1995-96]

SILENT BENEFICIARIES

969

divided along racial l ines when discussing this issue. Several students
believe that the elimination of affirmative action will give educational
institutions

free license to eliminate all programs that

are

designed to

increase diversity in the legal profession:
[I]t makes me think about survival of the fittest. If you're weak then
you're gone and I don't know. I think coming into an environment like
this I was real nervous and real intimidated and the program that I ' m
in makes me feel like I belong a little bit more and am a little more
comfortable and I think, you know, if you got the power you don 't need
things like that. And I'm afraid that is how it will be. That will just be
something that's just not important any more .
. . . I think it gives people a way out and I think if it's not recognized
on a federal level, then everybody may not take it as seriously, you
know, and give it as much credibility as it needs to have, and diversify
ing the legal profession or the medical profession or higher education,
in general, I think that that's going to be an outlet for people who don' t

think that it's important. I think a lot o f people that can't see beyond
themselves to helping somebody else, and I guess you have to go within

yourself to find out if that's important for you, but I think that it's
going to be a way to say, well, Congress says we are going to have to

do it, so we are not going to do it, and it' s just puke on you, and we 'll
go somewhere else. I think they don't look to the importance o f what
the programs are really doing. Like what we are getting out of these
programs doesn' t cross racial lines and doesn't cross gender lines except
it's going to help you succeed and be a good lawyer, doctor or
whatever. I think they are missing the point of the programs and
worrying about who is in the programs. So I think that's going to hurt
us and as a result there is going to be less of us, and less of me and less

of you, I don't think it's going to have a good effect.

It

was

interesting to note that some of the white women, who were

reluctant to acknowledge the impact of affirmative action programs in

any individual or group. ' " Joe Klein, The End ofAffirmative Action, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 1 3, 1995, at 36-37 (discussing CCR! and its impact on California and the
national political arena). See also Peter Annin, Battleground Chicago Report

From the Front: How Racial Preferences Really Work - Or Don 't, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 3, 1 995, at 26-33 ; Howard Fineman, Rage & Race, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3,

1 99 5, at 23-2 5 .
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their lives, agreed that the programs should continue in order to effectuate
racial diversity.92
Now that they are really chipping away at affirmative action, the thing
that concerns me is that, things are not equal out there and I think a lot
of us would agree. But I hear people say all the time, well women are
treated equally as a woman, it's nice that you have been treated equally,
but look around you, the m inorities are not treated equally and my
concern was with the decline of affirmative action that other people,
maybe a lot of white males and a lot of other people too will think that
everything is equal now and we really don't need it at all, and it can
really help everyone. I ' m just afraid that it's going to hurt a lot a
people.

F.

Tension Between Black and White Women Regarding Their Views
on Affirmative Action
A recurring theme underlying the comments of the white female

participants93 in this study is apathy toward the pres ervation of affirma
tive action initiatives incorporated either formally or informally into law
school ad.missions and academic support programs. The reticence of the
white women interviewed to support the continued implementation of
92

In response to a question regarding the complexion of the student body
at UT after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood, Dr. Robert Berdahl ,
President, University of Texas at Austin, noted that:
Well, I think if this ruling stands, universities like the University o f
Texas that have selective admissions policies will have much smaller
representation from minority students. I think one thing that's important
for us to remember in all of this is that the students who were admitted
- the minority students who were admitted are highly qualified
students. These are not students who . . . don't belong in this university.
We have very high standards for admission for all of our students, and

we're talking about very marginal differences between those of - of
minority applicants and those of majority applicants so that we simply
have a pro - had a process whereby in
order to achieve diversity in the
student popul tion, in order to
provide opportunities to minori
�
students, we did take - in those
small number of cases where their
cores
were
slightly lower than the majority students, we did take race
�
to
accou
m
nt to achieve that end.
Comments from televised intervi
er
ew of Dr. Berdahl, Cheryl Hopwood, and h
atto
y, Ted Olson by Edie Magnu
6
s, CBS This Morning, March 2 1 , 199 ·
See supra notes 3-5 and acc
ompanying text.

1?'

n;;
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affi nnative action programs parallels the struggle between race and
�der that manifested itsel f during the Reconstruction Era suffrage
movement.
The participants in this study raised some of the same concerns
expressed by the women in the Declaration of Sentiments issued by the
participants of the Seneca Falls Conference in 1 848, which is discussed
in the introduction to this symposium edition. 94 These are the same
concerns and issues that women, regardless of race, continue to grapple
with almost 1 50 years later. As expressed by the participants in this
study, tension exists between women over the allocation of social,
economic, and political resources generated b y affirmative action
gains.95 In 1848, the resource at issue was suffrage, which brought its

9-4

Carolyn S . Bratt, Introduction, 84 KY. L.J. 7 1 5 ( 1 995-96). For example,

in ANGELA Y . DA V IS

,

WOMEN, RACE & CLASS ( 1 9 8 1 ), Davis notes the

contradictions inherent in the 1 848 Seneca Falls Convention:

The inestimable importance of the Seneca Falls Declaration was its role
as the articulated consciousness ofwomen 's rights at midcentury. It was

the theoretical culmination of years of unsure, often silent, challenges

aimed at a political, social, domestic and religious condition which was

contradictory, frustrating and downright oppressive for women of the

bourgeoisie and the rising middle classes. However, as a rigorous

consummation of the consciousness of white middle-class women ' s

dilemma, the Declaration all but ignored the predicament of white

working-class women, as it ignored the condition of [b ]lack women in

the South and North alike. In other words , the Seneca Falls Declaration

proposed an analysis of the female condition which disregarded the

circumstances
framers.

Id. at 53-54.

of women outside the social class of the document's

95 See generally

Elizabeth Debold et al.,

From Betrayal to Power,

1 DUKE

J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 53 ( 1 994) (discussing the tension between parties
desiring suffrage based on race and on gender).
Within the last hundred-plus years, white women have repeatedly
opted to exercise their race privilege in order to g ain an advantage in
the competitive public world. The fledgling coalition of white and

African-American women fighting for suffrage was violently tom apart
when it became clear that Congress was seriously considering granting

suffrage to men o f color and not to women at all. White women argued
that they, because of their race, should be granted the right to vote

before men or women of color. This betrayal, white women's shame,

leaves a bitter taste in the mouths of African-American women even

today. Most women of color have justifiably internalized a deep
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holder the promise of both political and economic freedom. In 1 996, one
of the resources that causes contention between white women and minori
ties is affirmative action. The privileges associated with affirmative action
programs similarly provide its beneficiaries with the promise of political
and economic freedom.
Many would argue that affirmative action programs helped white
women obtain those promised levels of political and economic freedom.
However, Blacks and other m inority groups have not been

as

fortunate.

As a result, the struggle to preserve this remedial initiative continues in
earnest. However, the fight has lost a necessary ally because white
women, at least to the extent evidenced by the students in this study, are
action

reluctant to either acknowledge the benefits of affirmative

programs or advocate for their continuation. Most of the Black women
in this study readily assume that their presence in law school was the
explicit or implicit result of some type of affirmative action initiative.
Contrary to popular belief, however, this acknowledgement empowers the
women interviewed:
Coming in, just the people from the outside, some people say the only
reason . . . you got in [the subject law school] is because of affinnative
action and sometimes that gives you a complex, then you say in my
situation, I'll just work harder and prove that that's not the only reason
why I'm here.

·

·

·

I think I did have some kind of sick little thing I wanted to prove

that I was just as smart as everyone else. I think I did have that. So
that's why I really prepared for class, I wanted to answer all the
questions correctly and I think I impressed a few [faculty members].

·

·

·

I ' m trying to prove that I deserve to be here just as much as the

guy that is sitting next to me. And that is probably why I feel like I
have to answer these questions [asked by professors in class] if l know
them.

suspicio and mistrust of white people.
�
Women of color were not heard
or consider
an integral part of the last phase of the women' s
I?ovement. Tired of educating white women about their racist assump
tions, many women of color
have given up on the possibi lity of
.
speaking across race. White wome
n can begin to educate themselves
about the privilege they assum
e.
Id. at 6 1 .

�
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That's one of the reasons that I'm here . . . . Because I just don' t think
that we'll get that chance to prove ourselves if affinnative action is
eliminated that we have now. And I just worry about future generations.
I worry about my sister coming after me. How is it going to be for her.
It's something I think about pretty much daily.

The white female students were not as eager to acknowledge the role
affirmative action may have pl ayed in their admission to law s ch o ol :
It bothers me that it is necessary. I would like to think that we're all
here because of what 's in here [head] not because we're female or
we're Black, you know.
I don't like to think so but I'm a woman and I ' m in law school . This
is a [public] school and generally been, you know, a male dominated
field . . . I'm a woman and it could just as easily got me into school
and that's not a good thought. And I have been told that by someone
who didn't get into law school and his parents were very angry. They're
from back home and he didn't get into law school and they were angry
that I had gotten into law school . . . . And they thought that it was
because I was a woman. And I 've actually been told that. Now whether
that is true or not . . . I ' m as qualified as well as any other person here
. . . . [s]o maybe if there was no affinnative action I still would have
made the cut and you know, I don't know. I don't know how that
works really. I don't know if they go through and choose so many
women and so many men then that clearly would be not allowed. But
if they go for the sake of diversity, wanted to bring in these women and
oh, she's a poor woman, that's even better. And she's from (a small,
rural area], . . . she's going to fit lots of our areas.
Well, I like to think that I got into law school based on my brain not
on the fact that I was an old woman and I guess maybe when I walked
in that room for that academic support program thing it made me feel
as if I was chosen, as i f maybe that I might have gotten into law school
not based on my ability. That would have made me very angry. I don't
want to get anything because I ' m a woman or because I'm filling a slot
with a certain number of females over the age of forty. I don't know
how I really feel about affirmative action. I can see the benefit of it but
I do thin k people ' s ability ought to be the primary measuring point not
whether they are Black, white, yellow or orange or female or male.
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If the past is prologue for the future, history teaches us that the struggle
to preserve affirmative action programs will be as divisive to the
intersection o f race and gender96 as it was in the 1 800s when the fight
for suffrage caused a fissure between Black and white women in the
suffrage movement.
During the Reconstruction Era, Blacks and white women, most of
whom were former abolitionists, shared a common goal - universal suf
frage. 97 Notwithstanding the participation of Black women in the suf
frage movement, they were noticeably absent from the 300 Seneca Falls
conventioneers.98 Yet it was a Black man, Frederick Douglass, who

96

Many commentators have contributed to the contemporary dialogue

regarding the role of Black women in the feminist movement. See BELL HOOKS,
KILLING RAGE

( 1 995)

(discussing the role of Blacks and people of color in the

feminist movement):
It is usually materially privileged white women who identify

as

feminists, and who have gained greater social equality and power with
white men in the existing social structure, who resist most vehemently
the revolutionary feminist insistence that an anti-racist agenda must be
at the core of our movement if there is ever to be solidarity between
women and effective coalitions that cross racial boundaries and unite us
in common struggle. These are the women who are detennined to leave
the issue of race behind.
Id. at

101;

Michele Wallace, A Black Feminist 's Search/or Sisterhood, in ALL

THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF Us ARE

BRAVE

5- 12

(Gloria T. Hull et al. eds.,

1 982);

Kimberle Crenshaw, Demargina

lizing the Intersection ofRace and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntiDiscri
mination Doctrine, Feminist Theory andAntiracistPolitics,
F.

1 989 U.

CHI. LEGAL

1 39, 152-60; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
42 STAN. L. REv. 58 1 ( 1 990); see Trina Grillo & Stephanie M.

Theory,

Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making
Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-ISMS},
97

DUKE L.J.

For extensive analyses of suffrage, see generally DAVIS, supra

ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE

AND WHEN I ENTER ( 1 984);

( 1 975); PAULA

397.
note 94;

GIDDINGS, WHERE

BELL HOOKS, AIN 'T I A WOMAN (198 1 ); ELIZABETH

C. STANTON ET AL., HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE
98

1 99 1

See DAVIS, supra note

94, at 57

(1 887).

(discussing the absence of Black women

among the audience in attendance at the convention: "While at least one [b]lack
man was present . . . there was not a single [b]lack woman in attendance. Nor
did the convention's documents make even a passing reference to [b ]lack women.
In light of the organizers' abolitionist involvement, it would seem puzzling that

97, at 75 (noting
conventioneers included an audience of 300, and that even

slave women were entirely disregarded."); F'LEXNER, supra note
that the Seneca Falls
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seconded the resolution introduced by E lizabeth Cady Stanton advocating
voting rights for women .99 Al though Douglass s upported enfranchise
ment of women, he never wavered in his belief that enfranchisement of
Black men was of param ount importance. Douglass' urgent advocation

for enfranchisement o f Black men was due in large part to the physical
jeopardy faced by B l acks during this period,

as

eliminate the vestiges of slavery by permitting
economic and pol itical power.

1 00

well as the need to
Blacks to

develop

In 1 869, at a meeting of the American Equal Rights Association

("AERA"), Douglass spoke about the need for Black men to obtain the
vote:
When women, because they are women, are hunted down through the
cities of New York and New Orleans, when they are dragged from their

though no men were invited, 40 men participated in the Convention).
99 See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE 40-4 1 ( 1 978)
("Although the convention passed all other motions unanimously, it was seriously
divided over the suffrage. Frederick Douglass, who, himself disfranchised,
appreciated the importance of membership in the political community, was
Stanton's staunchest supporter at Seneca Falls. The woman suffrage resolution
barely passed."); see also STANTON ET AL., supra note 97, at 7 3 ("Mrs. Stanton
and Frederick Douglass seeing that the power to choose rulers and make laws,
was the right by which all others could be secured, persistently advocated the
resolution, and at last carried it by a small maj ority.").
1 00

Frederick Douglass prioritized Black male suffrage over suffrage for
women because of the political, economic, and physical oppression experienced
by Black men during the Reconstruction Era:
Douglass argued to consolidate and secure the new "free" status of
Southern Blacks: "Slavery is not abolished until the black man has the
ballot." This was the basis for his insistence that the strategic priority,
at the particular historical moment, over the effort to achieve the vote
for women. Frederick Douglass viewed the franchise as an indispensable
weapon which could complete the unfinished process of liquidating
slavery. When he argued that woman suffrage was momentarily less
urgent than the extension of the ballot to [b]lack men, he was definitely
not defending [b]lack male superiority. Although Douglass was by no
means entirely free of the influence of male-supremacist ideology and
while the polemical formulations of his arguments often leave some
thing to be desired, the essence of his theory that [b)lack suffrage was
a strategic priority was not in the least anti-women.
DAV IS, supra note 94, at 77-78 (quoting Frederick Douglass, Speech at Seneca
Falls Convention (July 1 9, 1 8 4 8)).
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houses and hung upon lamp posts; when their children are tom from
their anns, and their brains dashed upon the pavement; when they are
objects of insult and outrage at every tum; when they are in danger of
having their homes burnt down over their heads; when their children are
not allowed to enter schools; then they will have an urgency to obtain
the ballot equal to our own.

101

The strategic importance Douglass placed on suffrage for Black men was
not universally supported by Black women. Distinguished abolitionist,
1 2
Sojourner Truth, 0 openly voiced her concerns that once empowered,
Black men would exercise the same tyranny over Black women that white
men had exercised for years. 1 03 Truth's views were countered by B lack
poet and educator, Frances Ellen Harper, 104 who believed that white
racism, from men and women, was fundamentally more destructive to the
goals of Black women than sexism from Black men. 1 05 Harper said that
"[t]he white women all go for sex, letting race occupy a minor posi 

tion."1 06 However, she believed that "[b]eing black means that every
10 1

GIDDINGS, supra note 97, at 67. When asked about the applicability of his
statement to the rights of Black women, " 'Yes, yes, yes,' replied Douglass. 'It
is true for the [b]lack woman but not because she is a woman but because she

is [b]lack! ' " Id.
1 02
B LACK WOMEN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LIFE 2 34-42 (Bert
J. Loewenberg & Ruth Bogin eds., 1 976).
103

G IDDINGS, supra note 97, at 65.
Frances Ellen Harper was a noted author, educator, and participant in the
Underground Railroad. She wrote several poems about her experiences inc luding
The Slave Mother and Ethiopia. Giddings notes that from Harper' s point of view:
[T]he greatest obstacle to the progress of black women was not [b]lack
men but [w]hite racism, including the racism of her [w]hite "sisters. " At
a 1 869 convention, Harper expressed her support for the Fifteenth
Amendment. By that year she had reason to believe that if the bill was
defeated, [b]lack women would be less, not more, secure.
Id. at 66.
1 05
Id. Giddings wrote:
s an o cer of the AERA, Harper may have suspected that the
.
[w]htte femirust
s' sudden (and expedient) concern for [b]lack women
w� less th� genuine. . . . Black
women like Harper may have had
their co�plamts against [b]lack
men, but they must have looked down
on [w]hite women using them
as fodder to further their own selfish
ends.
Id.
106
Id. at 68.
1 04

�

�
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white, including every working-class white woman, can discriminate
against you."1 01 Harper' s views proved to be prophetic. With the
1 8
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 0 white women became increas
ingly concerned that B lack men would be elevated in status 109 and

power over them . 1 1 0 As the fissure between Blacks and white women

101
108
109

Id.
U.S. CON ST . amend. XIV.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and others who believed that because, in their

eyes, emancipation had rendered [b]lack people "equal" to white
women, the vote would render [b]lack men superior, were absolutely
opposed to [b]lack male suffrage. Yet there were those who understood
that the abolition of slavery had not abolished the economic oppression
of [b]lack people, who therefore had a special and urgent need for
political power.

DAVIS, supra note 94, at 72-73; see also DuBOIS, supra note 99:
The abolitionists advocates of black suffrage made their case in a
variety of ways, some of which coincided with arguments for woman
suffrage, others of which emphasized the difference between the two
demands. On the one hand, they argued that black men should be
enfranchised because the suffrage was a right of all citizens and a
source of self-respect and social power. Douglass described the
psychological impact of disfranchisement on black men with great
eloquence and in terms that could have been taken to apply equally to
women. By disfranchising black people, he explained, "you declare
before the world that we are unfit to exercise the elective franchise, and
by this means lead us to undervalue ourselves, and to feel that we have
no possibilities like other men." More frequently, however, supporters
of black suffrage insisted on the special historical significance and
unique strategic position of the ex-slaves. Southern blacks were a pro
northem force in the heart of the Confederacy and this linked their
enfranchisement to the preservation of the Union's victory and the
protection of the

Republican party's

power.

Black suffrage,

its

supporters argued, was the only secure basis for Reconstruction.
Feminists could make no such claims of partisan benefit or political
expediency for woman suffrage.

·

Id. at 56-57.
1 10
See DuBOIS, supra note 99, at 174-75. DuBois discusses the tension
between racism and sexism that manifested itself during the suffrage movement:
The position Stanton and Anthony took against the Fifteenth
Amendment reveals much about their political development after the
Civil War and especially after their 1 867 break w i th abolitionists. Their
objections to the amendment were simultaneously feminist and racist.

On the one hand, their commitment to an independent women's

.
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Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B . Anthony

became more adamant in their quest for women 's suffrage. In their
feminist newspaper, The Revolution, they wrote:
While the dominant party have with one hand lifted up TWO MILLION
BLACK MEN and crowned them with the honor and dignity of
citizenship," wrote Anthony, "with the other they have dethroned

FIFTEEN MILLION WHITE WOMEN - their own mothers and

movement was intensifying the feminism that underlay their demand for
woman suffrage. Although they acknowledged the similarities between
the inferior position women held with respect to men and the status of
other oppressed groups, they believed that women's grievances were
part of a distinct system of sexual inequality, which had its own roots
and required its own solutions. This led them to repudiate the Fifteenth
Amendment, not only because women were omitted from its provisions,
but because they believed that its ratification would intensify sexual
inequality. They argued that the doctrine of universal manhood suffrage
it embodied gave constitutional authority to men's claims that they were

women's social and political superiors. On the other hand, this feminism
was increasingly racist and elitist. The women among whom it was
growing were white and middle-class and believed themselves the social
and cultural superiors of the freedmen. The anti-Republican suffragists
chose to encourage these women to feel that the Fifteenth Amendment
meant a loss of status for them, and to try to transform their outraged
elitism into an increased demand for their enfranchisement. New
England suffragists also had racist arguments for women suffrage in
their rhetorical arsenal, but the political decision to maintain abolition
ists allies and to court Republican support kept them from using these
weapons. By contrast, the Revolution 's militant anti-Republicanism
permitted and even encouraged Stanton and Anthony to approach
woman suffrage by way of attacks on the freedmen.

Id. at 174-75.
111

Although Stanton and Anthony were allied with Douglass in their

campaigns to end slavery and obtain universal suffrage, Douglass' views on the
issue of Black male suffrage were substantially different:
The former slave population was still locked in a struggle to defend
their lives - and in Douglass' eyes, only the ballot could ensure their

victory. By contrast, the white middle-class women, whose interests
were represented by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony,
could not claim that their lives were in physical jeopardy. They were
not, like [b]lack men and women in the South, engaged in an actual war
for liberation.
DAVIS, supra note

94, at 79.
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sisters, their own wives and daughters - and cast them under the heel
of the lowest orders of manhood.

112

One year before the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment1 13 giv
ing Black men voting rights,

the universal

suffrage

organization,

AERA, founded by Douglass, Stanton, and Anthony, split over this
issue. 1 14 Thereafter,

the political movement

for suffrage

remained

segregated. During the period following the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment, until women received voting rights in 1920 pursuant to
the Nineteenth Amendment,
women suffragists.

1

1 16

15

racial

tensions

continued

to

divide

The racial mistrust and divisiveness that manifested itself during that
period continues to cause dissension between B lack and white wom
en. 1 1 7 The students participating in this study discussed the tension that

1 12

GIDDINGS, supra note 97, at 66. See also DuBOIS, supra note 99, at 1 62-

96, for a discussion of the role played by the Revolution in the feminist's
repudiation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
1 13

The Fifteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of

citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of

XV, § 1 .
note 97, at 67.

servitude." U.S. CONST. amend.
1 14

GIDDINGS, supra
The Nineteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied on account of sex." U.S.
1 15

CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 .
116
At this time, black women suffragists struggled for their enfranchise
ment in black women's organizations, or in segregated chapters of white
women's organizations; they marched for their enfranchisement in
segregated suffrage parades. However, many powerful forces in the
country were convinced that extending the franchise to black women
posed considerable risks. White women in the women's movement were
concerned that requesting extension of the franchise to black women
would damage their chances of gaining the vote for themselves.
Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place,
Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV . C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 3 1-32 (1989).
117
In Pamela J. Smith, We Are Not Sisters : African-A merican Women and
the Freedom to Associate and Disassociate, 66 TULANE L. REV. 1467 ( 1 992), the
author discusses the alienation Black women experience when discussing the
issue of racism and sexism with white women, thus encouraging Black women
to disas sociate from white women:
Racism may be the strongest reason for African-American �omen to
.
.
disassociate from white women. Whether the racism practiced is bemgn
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continues to exist between white and Black women regarding issues of
race and gender. The following exchange occurred in response to
concerns raised by a B l ack student that her fellow white students seem to
purposefully ignore racial incidents that occur at the subject law school:
White Woman: I think you have a complaint when you said that a lot
of the white people didn't notice. I think this isn't an excuse, I think
they need to be made aware that, I think that white people who have
always been around white people don't know. They just don't clue in,
it doesn't hit them that that would be offensive. Because if you don't
have Black friends or you haven't been around Black people, sometimes
I guess you can't empathizes but that's no excuse. They need to be
aware and say, "Hey, this is an offensive thing."
White Woman: I understand what you're saying. I'm thinking too,
though. I understand they haven't been around Black people but I think
part of it too is subconsciously that's how they see Black people so to
them it's like, okay. What's abnormal about this? We see it on the news
every day. It's just normal to them.
Black Woman: You two are white women and in a way, I guess I'm
sometimes I'm more frustrated because I figure you 're a woman so
somewhat of what I ' m going through you should relate to simply
because you're going to get it. 1 18 You're not getting it because of race

or subconscious, it exists. African-American women cannot force or
attempt to sway white women who may harbor racist feelings and
attitudes. White women must first recognize any racial animosity that

may be within themselves, and then try to confront these feelings. Until
they do, African-American women must disassociate to concentrate on
their unique problems and concerns.

Id. at 1480.
1 18

bell hooks writes that, without invalidating feminism , tensi on continues
•
to exist between Black and white women. She notes:
To black women the issue is not whether white women are more or less
racist than white men, but that they are racist. If women committed to
fem i�ist revolution, be they black or white,
are to achieve any under
standing of the "charged connections" between
white women and black
wo�en, we must first be willing to
examine woman' s relationship to
�ociety, to race, and to American culture as it is and not as we would
ideally have it be.

HOOKS,

supra note 97, at 1 24.

1995-96]

SILENT BENEFICIARIES

98 1

but because of gender. And sometimes I ' m like, as a woman, not you
particularly. but why do you have such trouble perceiving my frustra
tions when you re getting some yourself? Do you see what I 'm saying?
'

Because I'm getting it as a woman and as a Black person so I guess I ' m
frustrated i n that sense too. As a white woman you should know
somewhat of what I'm going through . . . I don ' t believe [white women
understand]. I mean. I real ly don' t believe they do.

CONCLUSION
It is clear that the women who participated in this study have
experienced the stigmatizing effects of racism and sexism throughout
their law school experience. The findings generated by this study suggest
that the stigmatization of these women is not a by-product of the
academic support or affirmative programs , but a systemic component of
legal education that was merely exacerbated by another bade of inferiority
- participation in the academic support program . Contrary to expecta
tions, however, the women did not sit idly by and wait for the courts or
the law school administration or even contemporary society to eliminate
the negative perceptions that are so prevalent

in their law school

experience. A significant number of the study 's participants achieved a
high level of academic success that enabled them to carve out their own
niche within the law school environment. By attaining the same academic
honors and merit based career opportunities coveted by their male
counterparts, the women made the stigma irrelevant in some cases, or i f
not irrelevant, at least worth the price o f success. After the initial
interviews were completed, a clear indication that the stigma associated
with the academic support program at the subj ect law school was
diminished is apparent from the requests by middle class white male
students to participate in the program. The findings of this investigation
clearly suggest that fear of stigmatizing should not outweigh the benefits

associated with implementation of academic support programs in law
scho ol.
Although it is clear that legal educatio n must respond to the diverse
needs of contemporary society by establish ing programs that encourage
the admittance and retention of women and minorities in law school , a
question regarding the constitutional validity of race and gender b � ed
affirmative action measures remains unresolved. Ultimately, the constitu
tional validity of affirmative action programs will be decided b?' t e
Supreme Court. Unti l then, institutions will continue to mamt�m
programs that attempt to alloc ate resources among divers� and competi�g
groups, notwithstanding the atmosphere of uncertamty and stnfe

�
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surrounding affirmative action. The fact that the study' s participants were
divided along racial lines when discussing this issue presents a troubling
indicator that this issue will continue to sustain a divisive barrier between
women.

